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Abstract: 
 As more sensitive data is shared and stored by third-party sites on the internet, there will be a need to encrypt data 
stored at these sites. One drawback of encrypting data is that it can be selectively shared only at a coarse-grained level. Attribute 
based encryption is a public-key-based one-to-many encryption that allows users to encrypt and decrypt data based on user 
attributes. A promising application of ABE is flexible access control of encrypted data stored in the cloud using  access policies 
and ascribed attributes associated with private keys and ciphertexts. This functionality comes at a cost. In typical implementation, 
the size of the ciphertext is proportional to the number of attributes associated with it and the decryption time is proportional to 
the number of attributes used during decryption. Specially, many practical ABE implementations require one pairing operation 
per attribute used during decryption. One of the main efficiency drawbacks of the existing ABE schemes is that decryption 
involves expensive pairing operations and the number of such operations grows with the complexity of the access policy. 
Recently green et al. proposed an ABE system with outsourced decryption that largely eliminates the decryption overhead for 
users. tn such a system a user provides an untrusted server, say a cloud to translate any ABE ciphertext satisfied by that user’s 
attributes or access policy into a simple ciphertext and it only incurs a small computational overhead for the users to recover the 
plaintext from the transformed ciphertext. Security of an ABE system with outsourced decryption ensures that an adversary will 
not be able to learn anything about the encrypted message; however it does not guarantee the correctness of the transformation 
done by the cloud. In this paper we consider a new requirement of ABE with outsourced decryption: verifiability. Informally, 
verifiability guarantees that a user can effectively check if the transformation is done correctly. We prove that our new scheme is 
both secure and verifiable without relying on random oracles. Finally, we show an implementation scheme and result of 
performance measurements, which indicates a significant reduction on computing resources imposed on users. 
Keywords: Attribute-based encryption, outsourced decryption, verifiability. 
I. Introduction 
There is a trend for sensitive user data to be 
stored by third parties on the internet. For 
example personal email, data and personal 
preferences are stored on web portal sites such as 
google and yahoo. The attack correlation center, 
dshield.org, presents aggregated views of attacks 
on the internet, but stores intrusion reports 
individually submitted by users. Given the 
variety, amount and the importance of 
information stored at these sites, there is cause 
for concern that personal data will be 
compromised. In distributed settings with 
untrusted servers, such as the cloud many 
applications need mechanisms for complex 
access control over encrypted data, sahai and 
waters[1] addressed this issue by introducing the 
notion of attribute based encryption. ABE is a 
new public key based one-to-many encryption 
that enables access control over encrypted data 
using access policies and ascribed attributes 
associated with private keys and cipher texts the 
cryptosystem of sahai and waters allowed for 
decryption when at least k attributes overlapped 
between a ciphertext and a private key. While 
this primitive was shown to be useful for error-
tolerant encryption with biometrics the lack of 
expressebility seems to limit its applicability to 
larger systems. There are two kinds of ABE 
schemes: key-policy ABE(KP-ABE) [2]-[7] and 
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ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [8], [9], [5], 
[6]. In a CP-ABE scheme, every ciphertext is 
associated with an access policy on attributes and 
every user’s private key is associated with a set 
of attributes. A user is able to decrypt a 
ciphertext only if the set of attributes associated 
with the user’s private key satisfies the access 
policy associated with the ciphertext. In a KP-
ABE scheme, the roles of an attribute set and an 
access policy are swapped from what we 
described for CP-ABE: attributes sets are used to 
annotate the ciphertexts and access policies over 
these attributes are associated with user’s private 
keys. One of the main efficiency drawbacks of 
the most existing ABE schemes is that 
decryption is expensive for resource-limited 
devices due to pairing operations and the number 
of pairing operations required to decrypt a 
ciphertext grows with the complexity of the 
access policy. At the cost of security only proven 
in a weak model there exist several expressive 
ABE schemes[10], [11] where the decryption 
algorithm only requires a constant number of 
pairing computations. Green et al[12] proposed 
a remedy to this problem by introducing the 
notion of ABE with outsourced decryption, 
which largely eliminates the decryption overhead 
for users. Based on existing ABE schemes Green 
et al [12] also presented concrete ABE schemes 
with outsourced decryption. tn these schemes a 
user provides an untrusted server, say a proxy 
operated by a cloud service provider, with a 
transformation key TK that allows the latter to 
translate any ABE ciphertext CT satisfied by that 
user’s attributes or access policy into a simple 
ciphertext CT and it only incurs a small overhead 
for the user to recover the plaintext form the 
transformed ciphertext CT. the security property 
of the ABE scheme with outsourced decryption 
guarantees that an adversary be not able to learn 
anything about the encrypted message; however 
the scheme provides no guarantee on the 
correctness of the transformation done by the 
cloud server. 
 
Fig: ABE system with outsourced decryption. 
 Consider a cloud based electronic medical 
record system in which patients medical records 
are protected using ABE schemes with 
outsourced decryption and are stored in the 
cloud. Inorder to efficiently access patients 
medical records on her mobile phone a doctor 
generates and delegates a transformation key to a 
proxy in the cloud for outsourced decryption. 
 Given a transformed ciphertext from the 
proxy, the doctor can read a patient’s medical 
record by just performing a simple step of 
computation. If no verification of the correctness 
of the transformation is guaranteed, however the 
system might run into the following two 
problems: 1) for the purpose of saving 
computing cost, the proxy could return a medical 
record transformed previously for the same 
doctor; 2) due to system malfunction or 
malicious attack, the proxy could send the 
medical record of another patient or a file of the 
correct form but carrying wrong information. 
The consequence of treating the patient based on 
incorrect information could be very serious or 
even catastrophic. 
 The above observation motivates us to study 
ABE with verifiable outsourced decryption in 
this paper.  
Our contributions 
 In green et al. [12] provided the verifiability 
of the cloud’s transformation and provided a 
method to check the correctness of the 
transformation. However the authors did not 
formally define verifiability. 
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 In this paper we first modify the original 
model of ABE with outsourced decryption in 
[12] to allow for verifiability of the 
transformations. After describing the formal 
definition of verifiability, we propose a new 
ABE model and based on this new model 
construct a concrete ABE scheme with verifiable 
outsourced decryption. Our scheme does not rely 
on random oracles 
The rest of the paper we only focus on CP-ABE 
with verifiable outsourced decryption. The same 
approach applies to KP-ABE with verifiable 
outsourced decryption which will omit here in 
order to keep the paper compact. 
To access the performance of our ABE scheme 
with verifiability outsourced decryption we 
implement the CP-ABE scheme with verifiable 
outsourced decryption and conduct experiments 
on both an ARM-based mobile device and Intel-
core personal computer to model a mobile user 
and a proxy respectively.   
Literature Survey 
 In cloud environments if a data owner wants 
to share data with users he will encrypt data and 
then upload to cloud storage service. Through 
the encryption the cloud cannot know the 
information of the encrypted data. Besides to 
avoid the unauthorized user accessing the 
encrypted data in the cloud, a data owner uses 
encryption scheme for access control of 
encrypted data. In existing schemes many 
encryption schemes can achieve and provide 
security assure data confidentiality and prevent 
collusion attack scheme. One of the attribute-
based encryption scheme. according to the access 
policy two types of these schemes can be 
classified the key-policy and ciphertext-policy 
attribute-based encryption schemes. The key-
policy attribute-based encryption scheme is that 
the access policy is attached to the user’s private 
key and a set of descriptive attributes is in the 
encrypted data. If a set of attributes satisfies the 
access policy the user will recover the message. 
If not he cannot it 
 The ciphertext-policy attribute-based 
scheme is that the access policy is associated to 
the encrypted data, and a set of descriptive 
attributes is in the user’s private key. If a set 
attribute satisfies the access policy, the user can 
decipher the encrypted data.  
 In the subsection we review some closely 
related works including non interactive verifiable 
computation,  pairing delegation and proxy 
reencryption. 
Non-interactive Verifiable Computation: Non-
interactive verifiable computation[19], [20] 
enables a computationally weak client to 
outsource the computation of a function to one or 
more workers. The workers return the result of 
the function evaluation as well as a non-
interactive proof that the computation of the 
function was carried out correctly. Since these 
schemes [19], [20] deal with outsourcing of 
general computation problems and preserve the 
privacy of input data, they can be used to 
outsource decryption in ABE systems. However 
the schemes proposed in [19], [20] use Gentry’s 
fully homomorphic encryption system[21] as a 
building block, thus the overhead in these 
schemes is currently too large to be practical 
[22]. Parno et al. [23] establish an important 
connection between verifiable computation and 
ABE. They show how to construct a verifiable 
computation scheme with public delegation and 
public verifiability from any ABE scheme and 
how to construct a multifunction verifiable 
computation scheme form the ABE scheme with 
outsourced decryption presented in [12]. 
Goldwasser et al. [24] propose a succinct 
functional encryption scheme, one can obtain a 
delegation scheme with is both publicly 
verifiable and secret, in the sense that the prover 
does not learn anything about input or output of 
the function being delegated. All these schemes 
[19], [20], [23], [24] focus on delegating general 
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functions and are not sufficiently efficient for the 
problem at hand. 
Pairing Delegation: pairing delegation [25], [26] 
enables a client to outsource the computation of 
pairings to another entity. However the schemes 
proposed in [25], [26] still require the client to 
compute multiple exponentiations in the target 
group for every pairing it outsources. 
 Most importantly when using pairing 
delegation in the decryption of ABE ciphertexts 
the amount of computation of the client is still 
proportional to the size of the access policy. 
Tsang et al. [27] consider batch pairing 
delegation. However the scheme proposed in 
[27] can only handle batch delegation for 
pairings in which one of the points is a constant 
and it still requires the client to compute a 
pairing. 
Proxy Reencryption: in ABE with outsourced 
decryption a user provides the cloud with a 
transformation key that allows the cloud to 
translate an ABE ciphertext on message m into a 
simple ciphertext on the same m, without 
learning anything about m. this is reminiscent 
allows a proxy using a reencryption key to 
transform an encryption of m. we emphasize that 
in the model of proxy reencryption, verifiability 
of the proxy’s transformation cannot be 
achieved. 
Proposed CP-ABE scheme with verifiable 
outsourced Decryption 
     For the national purposes in the below we 
denote the above CP-ABE scheme as Basic CP-
ABE. Based on Basic CP-ABE we present a CP-
ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced 
decryption. The Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and 
Decrypt algorithms operate exactly as in Basic 
CP-ABE. We describe the Reencryption 
algorithms: 
 GenTKout(PK, SKS) this algorithm takes 
as input the public parameters PK and a 
private key SKS= (S,K, K0, Ki) for a set 
of attributes S. it chooses a random 
value z€ Z*P. Then  it sets the 
transformation key as TKS= (S, K’=K1/z, 
K’0= K01/z, K’i=Ki1/z) and the retrieving 
key as RKS=z. note that with 
overwhelming probability z has 
multiplicative inverse. 
 Tranformout(PK, CT, TKS) This 
algorithm takes as input parameters PK, 
a ciphertext CT=(A= (A, ρ), C, C1, C1’, 
C1,I D1,I, C2, C2’, C2,I, D2,i) for an access 
structure A=(A,ρ), and a transformation 
key TKS= (S, K’, K’0, Ki’) for a set of 
attributes S. it then computes: 
T1’=                   e(C1’, K’) 
 
            (Πi€I(e(C1,I, K0’). E(K’ρ(i), D1, i))wi) 
 
=       e(g,g)αs/z e(g,g)ats/z 
   (Πi€I e(g,g)atAi.v.wi/z) 
= e(g,g)αs/z, 
T2’=                   e(C2’, K’) 
    
(Πi€I(e(C2,I, K0’). e(K’ρ(i), D2, i))wi) 
 
=      e(g,g)αs’/z e(g,g)ats’/z 
      (Πi€I e(g,g)atAi.v’.wi/z) 
= e(g,g)αs’/z, 
and outputs the transformed ciphertext as CT’=(T^= 
C^, T1= C1, T1’, T2= C2, T2’). 
 
 Decryptout(PK, CT, CT’, RKS) this algorithm 
takes as input the public parameters PK, a 
ciphertext CT= (A=(A,ρ), C^, C1, C1’, C1,I, 
D1,I, C2, C2’, C2,I, D2,i), a transformed 
ciphertext CT’=(T, T1, T1’, T2, T2’) and a 
retrieving key RKS=z for a set of attributes 
S. If T^≠C^ or T1≠C1 or T2≠C2 it outputs┴. 
Then it computes M= T1/T1’z and M= 
T2/T2’z. if T^=uH(M)vH(M)d, it outputs the 
message M; otherwise it outputs ┴.  
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Security Model for CP-ABE: 
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and 
gives the public parameters, PK to the adversary. 
Phase 1:The adversary makes repeated private keys 
corresponding to sets of attributes S1,…..,Sq1.  
Challenge: The adversary submits two equal length 
messages M0 and M1. In addition the adversary gives 
a challenge access structure A* such that none of the 
sets S1,…..,Sq1 from phase 1 satisfy the access 
structure. The challenger flips a random coin b, and 
encrypts Mb under A*. the ciphertext CT* is given to 
the adversary. 
Phase 2: phase 1 is repeated with the restriction that 
none of sets of attributes Sq1+1,……,Sq satisfy the 
access structure corresponding to the challenge. 
Guess: the adversary outputs a guess b1 of b. 
 The advantage of an adversary A in this 
game is defined as Pr[b1=b]-1/2. We note that the 
model can easily be extended to handle chosen-
ciphertext attacks by allowing for decryption queries 
in Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
Security intuition: As in previous attribute-based 
encryption schemes the main challenge in designing 
our scheme was to prevent against attacks from 
colluding users. Like the scheme of Sahai and Waters 
[24] our solution randomizes users private keys such 
that they cannot be combined; however in our 
solution the secret sharing must be embedded into the 
ciphertext instead to the private keys. Inorder to 
decrypt an attacker clearly must recover e(g,g)αs. 
Inorder to do this the attacker must pair C from the 
ciphertext with the D component from some user’s 
private key. This will reduced in the desired value 
e(g,g)αs, but blinded by some value e(g,g)rs.  
Efficiency: The efficiencies of the key generation 
and encryption algorithms are both fairly 
straightforward. The encryption algorithm will 
require two exponentiations for each leaf in the 
ciphertext’s access tree. The ciphertext size will 
include two group elements for each leaf. The key 
generation algorithm requires two exponentiations for 
every attribute given to the user, and the private key 
consists of two group elements for every attribute.  
Performance Measurements:  
 We now provide some information on the 
performance achieved by cpabe toolkit. As expected 
cpabe-keygen runs in time precisely linear in the 
number of attributes associated with the key it is 
issuing. The running time of cpabe-enc is also almost 
perfectly linear with respect to the number of leaf 
nodes in the access policy. The performance of 
cpabe-dec is somewhat more interesting. It is slightly 
more difficult to measure in the absence of a precise 
application, since the decryption time can depend 
significantly on the particular access trees and set of 
attributes involved.  
 In summary cpabe-keygen and cpabe-enc 
run in a predictable amount of time based on the 
number of attributes in a key or leaves in a policy 
tree. 
Conclusion: 
 In this paper we considered a new 
requirement of ABE with outsourced decryption: 
efficiency, verifiability. We proposed Concrete ABE 
scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption and 
proved it is secure and verifiable. As scheme 
substantially reduced the computation time required 
for resource limited devices to recover plaintexts. 
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